Operation Faux Pas Should Be Avoided

On February 21, 2016, three men from the Indian Army’s elite Special Forces lost their lives while trying to evict two terrorists from Pampores Entrepreneurship Development Institute in the Kashmir Valley. The deaths of Captain Pawan Kumar, Captain Tushar Mahajan and Lance Naik Om Prakash raised several questions on the conduct of such operations.



As reported in the media, several inexplicable decisions were taken during the operation. In a somewhat similar incident, on October 4, 2017, four US soldiers of the Special Operations Forces along with four Nigerien soldiers and an interpreter were killed in an operation in Niger. Cut off from their unit, the tiny band of American soldiers came under a barrage of gunfire from fighters loyal to the Islamic State.



The families of those killed were not even aware of the deployment of their loved ones in Niger. Both the incidents raise questions on likely intelligence failure, training of troops, military tactics and decisions of military commanders in undertaking such operations.



While in the Indian incident, the media made certain comments on the operation; the US government on May 10, has released an investigation report on the operation in Niger.



The investigation team from the US Africa Command (AFRICOM) examined documentary, photographic, audio, video, and testimonial evidence and interviewed 143 witnesses. It identified individual, organisational, and institutional failures and deficiencies that contributed to the tragic event.



A few military veterans, as reported in the media, are of the view that the operation was wrongly conducted during the night and there might have been a general lack of intelligence awareness. These veterans have also raised the issue of command and control of the Special Forces (SF) in India.



The SFs are small teams that depend on secrecy, speed and mobility to achieve their targets behind the enemy lines. There is no single command for all the SFs in India. The SF units of the Army, Navy and Air Force are all independent of each other. In the Army, SFs have been placed under the Parachute Regiment, which is meant for large-scale airborne operations. The National Security Guard reports to the Ministry of Home Affairs, while the other SF units report to the Research and Analysis Wing. As a result, the different units work in a disjointed manner, at times creating confusion during joint operations.



What it points to is the need for an authentic investigation report by the Ministry of Defence to bring out the facts relating to the incident, individual and organisational failings, if any, and remedial actions to be taken to avoid such lapses in the future. Unfortunately, the inquiries conducted by the Armed Forces in such incidents remain classified and wrapped in layers of secrecy. Military commanders are empowered by a Victorian law to withhold investigation reports from the public. Under the Army Rule 184, the Chief of the Army Staff can deny a copy of a court of inquiry even to a military person whose character or military reputation is adversely affected by the evidence in the inquiry. Such unjustified power can be misused to hide organisational failures from the civil society. The time has come to make the findings and recommendations of such inquiries public, to generate a meaningful debate or to introduce reforms in the functioning of the military or the government.